Sequential auctions for common value objects with budget constrained bidders by Fatima, Shaheen et al.
Sequential Auctions for Common Value Objects
with Budget Constrained Bidders
Shaheen S. Fatima
Department of Computer Science, Loughborough University
Loughborough, LE11 3TU, UK.
S.S.Fatima@lboro.ac.uk
Michael Wooldridge
Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool
Liverpool L69 3BX, UK.
mjw@liverpool.ac.uk
Nicholas R. Jennings
School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton
Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK.
nrj@ecs.soton.ac.uk
Abstract
This paper analyzes sequential auctions for budget constrained bidders, for
multiple heterogeneous common value objects. In most auctions, bidders not only
have valuations for objects but also have budget constraints (i.e., constraints on
how much they can actually spend in an auction). Given these constraints, the
bidders’ problem is to determine how much to bid in each auction. To this end,
thispaperanalyzesthestrategicbehaviorofbiddersanddeterminestheequilibrium
bidding strategies for the individual auctions that constitute a series. We do this
in an incomplete information setting where the bidders are uncertain about their
budget constraints, and obtain equilibrium bidding strategies for the participants in
individual auctions in a series.
1 Introduction
Negotiation is a key form of interaction in multiagent systems. It is a process in
which disputing agents decide how to divide the gains from cooperation. Since
this decision is made jointly by the agents themselves [17, 13], each party can only
obtain what the other is prepared to allow them. The simplest form of negotiation
involves two agents and a single issue. For example, consider a scenario in which
a buyer and a seller negotiate on the price of a good. To begin, the two agents
are likely to differ on the price at which they believe the trade should take place,
but through a process of joint decision-making they either arrive at a price that is
mutually acceptable or they fail to reach an agreement. Since agents are likely
1to begin with different prices, one or both of them must move toward the other,
through a series of offers and counter offers, in order to obtain a mutually accept-
able outcome. However, before the agents can actually perform such negotiations,
they must decide the rules for making offers and counter offers. That is, they must
set the negotiation protocol or mechanism [17]. On the basis of this protocol, each
agent chooses its strategy (i.e., what offers it should make during the course of
negotiation). However, in most real-world negotiations, there are more than two
parties involved. In such cases, the most widely used mechanisms are auctions.
Auctions are now being widely studied as a means of buying/selling resources
in multiagent systems [1, 10, 18]. This is because auctions are not only simple, but
can also have desirable economic properties, probably the most important of which
are their ability to generate high revenues to the seller and also allocate resources
efﬁciently [20]. Now, in many cases the number of objects to be auctioned is
more than one. For example, consider a grid environment where a set of limited
processing resources must be sold to a subset of agents that compete for them.
Different resources become available for sale at different times and must therefore
be sold in sequential auctions.
Fundamentally, there are two approaches to multi-object auctions. The ﬁrst is
to allow bidders to submit bids on bundles of items (these are called combinatorial
auctions) [18]. The second is to auction each object independently of all others in
a series of auctions (which can either be arranged to run sequentially or in parallel
with one another). In this paper we focus on the latter approach and in particular on
the sequential case. There are two reasons for this. First, although combinatorial
auctions generate economically efﬁcient allocations, they can be computationally
complex to implement [19, 18]. Second, in many real-world auctions where dif-
ferent objects become available at different time points, the objects need to be
allocated sequentially.
Given this context, it is important to study the strategic behavior of bidders to
determine the equilibrium bidding strategies for such settings. To this end, this
paper focuses on sequential auctions for heterogeneous common value objects for
budget constrained bidders. Now, in the context of private value auctions, it has
been shown that the equilibrium bids for the individual auctions that comprise a
series depend on the auction agenda (i.e., the order in which the objects are auc-
tioned)[3]. Thisorderingisimportantbecause, ifwechangeitthentheequilibrium
bids also change. Given this, we ﬁrst show that the equilibrium bids for sequen-
tial common value auctions also depend on the agenda. Then, we determine the
equilibrium bidding strategies for sequential auctions using second-price rules.
In more detail, we study the bidding behaviour of agents for multiple hetero-
geneous common value objects. Each bidder has a budget constraint which may
be different for different bidders. Furthermore, each bidder’s budget constraint al-
lows it to buy at most one object. In other words, the scenario is that of multiple
objects being sold in a series of sequential auctions and each bidder being able to
buy at most one object. Speciﬁcally, we determine equilibrium bidding strategies,
for each individual auction, for bidders that are uncertain about their budget con-
straints. This model is an extension of [11], which studied sequential auctions for
private value objects with bidders having no budget constraint. Here, we extend
this model to common value objects with bidders having budget constraints.
To date, most of the existing work on sequential auctions has focused on sce-
narios in which all objects are identical [22, 12]. Sequential auctions for heteroge-
neous private-value objects have been studied in [16], and those for common value
2objects in [2], but both have been studied under the assumption of complete in-
formation. Elmaghraby [8] studies sequential auctions for heterogeneous private-
value objects using only the second-price sealed-bid rules. Our work differs from
the above mentioned work in that we combine the two features of common-values
and budget-constraints in our analysis (see Section 5 for details).
Against this background, this paper contributes to the state of the art in multi-
objectauctionsbyprovidingastudyofthebiddingbehaviourofbudgetconstrained
bidders for sequential auctions for common-value objects in an incomplete infor-
mation setting
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes a com-
plete information model. We then extend the analysis to an incomplete information
setting where the bidders are uncertain about each others budget constraints. This
setting is described in described in Section 3. For this setting, Section 4 determines
equilibrium bids. Section 5 discusses related work and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Complete Information Setting
Consider a model where there are two common value objects (C and D) to be
auctioned and only two bidders (b1 and b2) that bid for these objects. Bidders b1
and b2 are constrained not to spend more than x1 and x2 respectively, where x1 >
x2. We will ignore the trivial case where x1  2x2 (i.e., b1 can buy both objects)
and concentrate on the situation where each bidder can buy at most one object. Let
a1 and a2 denote the common values of the objects C and D respectively, such
that a1 > a2. For our present analysis, we consider the case where x1  a2 (i.e.,
each bidder’s budget constraint is less than or equal to the value of each object).
As each bidder can buy at most one object, the issue regarding the objects being
substitutes or complements does not arise. Let A1 denote the auction for the ﬁrst
object and A2 that for the second one.
The auction forms we use are as follows. All auctions in the series are con-
ducted using the same form which may be a ﬁrst- or second-price form. In this
section, we consider the complete information setting where each bidder and the
auctioneer knows not only the values of the two objects but also each bidder’s bud-
get constraint. Given this, we analyze the bidding behaviour and show how this
depends on the auction agenda.
2.1 Second-price auctions
Consider the case where the second price sealed bid (SPSB) rules are used for
auctions A1 and A2. During the ﬁrst auction, A1, one of the two objects, say C, is
auctioned. The winner of auction A1 is determined and notiﬁed. Object D is then
auctioned during A2. During auction Ak (for k = 1;2), bidder bi submits a sealed
bid Bi, and given these bids, the player’s payoffs are:

k
i =

a
k
i   maxj6=iBj if Bi > maxj6=iBj
0 if Bi < maxj6=iBj
If there is a tie, the object goes to each winning bidder with equal probability.
The problem for a bidder is to ﬁnd a bidding strategy that will maximize its
expected payoff subject to its budget constraint. As we will show, a bidder’s pay-
off for the case where each object is auctioned using the second price sealed bid
3(SPSB) rules is the same as its payoff for the case where each object is auctioned
using the English auction rules. To show this, we ﬁrst analyse each bidders’ strate-
gic behaviour for the English auction rules and then for the SPSB rules.
If English auction rules are used for each individual object, the problem for
bidders is to determine how much to bid at the ﬁrst auction. In order to understand
this, assume that the ﬁrst object has been auctioned. The second object will then go
to the player who has a higher residual budget (i.e., more money left after the ﬁrst
auction), at a cost equal to the other player’s residual budget plus an inﬁnitesimal
amount, . Thus the only decision that each player has to make is how much to bid
for the ﬁrst auction.
Suppose, during auction A1, player b2 has just bid B, which is fractionally
more than player b1’s last bid. At this stage player b1 needs to decide whether it
should continue bidding in the ﬁrst auction. If player b1 decides to bid fractionally
more than B, and this happens to be the winning bid, it wins the ﬁrst object and
makes a proﬁt of (a1   B). It seems that if (x1   B > x2), player b1 could also
win the second object. But player b2’s equilibrium strategy must be to force player
b1 up sufﬁciently, to more than x1   x2, so that player b2 can get at least one of
the two objects. In other words, each bidder exploits the other’s budget constraint
to maximize its own expected proﬁt. On the other hand, if player b1 does not make
the next bid during auction A1, player b2 will get the object at B. This will leave
player b2 with x2   B for the second auction. Since x1 > x2   B, player b1 gets
the second object at x2  B and makes a proﬁt of a2  (x2  B). Thus during the
ﬁrst auction, player b1 will bid B provided:
B  x1 and (a1   B) > a2   (x2   B):
Let B1 denote the highest bid that player b1 makes during the auction for the ﬁrst
object. Player b1 will continue bidding up to B1, where b1 satisﬁes the following
constraint:
B1  min(x1;
1
2
(a1   a2 + x2)). (1)
A similar analysis for player b2 leads to the criterion that it will continue bid-
ding up to B2, where B2 satisﬁes the following condition:
B2  min(x2;
1
2
(a1   a2 + x1)). (2)
Thus, the above two relations give the limits of the bids for the two bidders. An
equilibriumoutcomewilloccurwhenoneoftheplayersreachesthislimit. Theﬁrst
objectwillgototheotherplayeratthisprice. Theequilibriumoutcomedependson
the order in which the two objects are auctioned. This is illustrated in the following
example.
Example 1 Let a1 = 110, a2 = 60, x1 = 60, and x2 = 40. Let B1 denote
the bid for player b1 and B2 that for b2 during the auction for the ﬁrst object.
Consider the case where object C is auctioned ﬁrst. Player b1 will bid B1 provided
the following condition is satisﬁed.
B1  min(60;
1
2
(110   60 + 40)) = 45.
Player b2 will bid B2 provided the following condition is satisﬁed.
B2  min(40;
1
2
(110   60 + 60)) = 40.
4Since B1 > B2, player b1 gets the ﬁrst object for 40. Thereafter, player b2 gets
the second object for 60   40 = 20. This results in a pay off of 70 to b1 and 40 to
b2. The total revenue to the seller from the two objects is 60.
Consider the case where the order in which the objects are sold is reversed,
i.e., a1 = 60 and a2 = 110. Player b1 now bids up to
B1  min(60;
1
2
(60   110 + 40)) =  5.
Since a player cannot bid negative values, b1 does not bid during the ﬁrst auction.
Player b2 will bid b2 provided
B2  min(40;
1
2
(60   110 + 60)) = 5.
So player b2 gets the ﬁrst object for nothing and player b1 gets the second object
for 40. This results in a pay off of 60 to both players. The seller’s total revenue
now is 40.
As the above example illustrates, the equilibrium outcome for sequential English
auctions depends on the order in which the objects are auctioned.
We now turn to the case where the SPSB rules are used for each object. Let P
denote:
P = min(x1;
1
2
(a1   a2 + x2))
and Q denote:
Q = min(x2;
1
2
(a1   a2 + x1))
During auction A1, it is a dominant strategy for bidder b1 to bid B1 = P, and
for bidder b2 to bid B2 = Q. In order to understand this consider bidder b1.
By bidding B1, b1 will win if P > B2 and lose if P < B2 (if P = B2, b1
is indifferent between winning and losing). Suppose that b1 bids z1 < x1. If
P > z1 > B2, then b1 still wins and its proﬁt is still a1   P. On the other hand,
if B2 > P > z1, it still loses. However, if P > B2 > z1, then it loses whereas
if it had bid P, it would have made a positive proﬁt. Thus, bidding less than P
can never increase b1’s proﬁt but in some cases may actually decrease it. A similar
argument can be used to show that it is not proﬁtable for b1 to bid more than P. In
the same way it can be veriﬁed that it is a dominant strategy for bidder b2 to bid Q.
Furthermore, since there are no more objects to be auctioned after A2, each
bidder’s optimal strategy during A2 is the same as that for a single object SPSB
auction. In other words, the bidder with the lower residual budget bids its budget,
and the bidder with the higher residual budget bids inﬁnitesimally more than the
other’s residual budget. Thus, the outcome of auction A1 (A2), if the English
auction rules are used for A1 and A2 is the same as the outcome of A1 (A2) if the
SPSB rules are used for A1 and A2. In other words, each bidders’ payment for
auction A1 (A2), if the English auction rules are used is the same as its payment
for auction A1 (A2) if the SPSB rules are used.
3 The Incomplete Information Setting
There are m common value objects denoted (1;2;:::;m) for sale. Each object
is sold in a separate auction using the ﬁrst- or second-price rules and the auctions
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with n <= m is trivial as each bidder can win an object. The bidders are denoted
b1;b2;:::;bn.
As in Section 2, each bidder has a budget constraint. However, unlike the
complete information setting of Section 2, here the information about budget con-
straints is uncertain to the bidders. Each bidder has a constraint which allows it to
buy at most one object. Also, since the sequential auctions are held over a period
of time, a bidder’s budget may vary over time. We model this variation as follows.
Each bidder’s budget constraint is i.i.d in the interval [0;!] according to an
increasing distribution function F. Thus, each bidder’s budget constraint is a ran-
dom variable denoted X. The probability distribution function F for X is known
to the bidders. However, each bidder draws its budget from F. If xi denotes bi’s
realization of X, then xi is known only to bi, but not to other bidders.
Assume that the seller has access to a private source of information
1 about the
value of the two objects. Since each player is a proﬁt maximizer, and for common
value auctions, it has been shown that an auctioneerr can raise its revenue by re-
vealing its information publicly [14], we consider the case where the auctioneer
makes its private information known to all bidders before the auctions begin. The
seller and all n bidders thus know the values, a1;:::;am, of the m objects. The
objects have additive value (i.e., they are neither substitutes nor complements).
These objects are auctioned using m auctions (A1::::;Am) that are carried out
sequentially, one after another. The agenda is known to the auctioneer and the bid-
ders. As in the case of the complete information setting, the winner for auction Ai
(where 1  i  m) is announced and then auction Ai+1 is conducted.
The sequential auctions are conducted as follows. The ﬁrst object is sold in
A1. There are n bidders for this auction. The winning bid for the ﬁrst auction
is announced at the end of the auction. Each bidder needs a single object. Thus
the winning bidder for an auction does not participate in any of the subsequent
auctions. All the losing bidders for an auction go to the next auction. This process
repeats for each of the m objects. In other words, the bidders continue to bid in
the auctions only until they win an object. Thus, if there are n bidders in the ﬁrst
auction, then there are n 1 bidders for the second, n 2 for the third, and so on.
In general, there are n   j + 1 bidders for auction j (1  j  m).
In more detail, the auctions are held as follows:
1. All the bidders draw their budget constraints for auction Aj from the p.d.f.
F.
2. Auction Aj is held; at the end of the auction, the object is allocated to the
winning bidder.
3. The winning bidder for auction Aj leaves (because each bidder has unit
demand) and the remaining bidders go to the next auction (Aj+1).
4. For the next auction (Aj+1), the bidders draw their budget constraints (con-
straints for auction Aj (1  j  m) are drawn from the p.d.f. F).
5. Steps 2 to 4 are repeated for each of the remaining objects.
Note that each of the m auctions are held using the same rule which may be En-
glish, SPSB, Dutch, or FPSB. For instance, if A1 is held using English auction
1For example, in the context of auctions for oil drilling rights, the auctioneer (i.e., government) may
have information about the common value of these rights.
6rules, then A2 to Am are also held using English auction rules. Likewise, for the
other three rules.
For this model we now determine the equilibrium bidding strategies.
4 EquilibriumBidsforIncompleteInformation
In this setting, the p.d.f for the bidders’ budget constraints (i.e., F), the number of
objects (m), the number of bidders for the ﬁrst auction (n), and the auction agenda
are common knowledge to the bidders.
Since there is more than one auction, a bidder’s bid for an auction depends not
only on that auction but also on the proﬁt he expects to get from the future auctions.
This proﬁt depends on the number of bidders that participate in the future auctions.
Given this, we ﬁrst determine this proﬁt and then ﬁnd the equilibrium bids.
If the number of bidders for the ﬁrst auction is n, then let 1(y;j;m;n) denote
a bidder’s ex-ante probability of winning the yth (for j  y  m) auction in the
series from the jth to the mth one before the jth auction begins. For instance,
consider 1(1;1;m;n), which is the probability of winning the ﬁrst auction in the
series of auctions from the ﬁrst to the mth one. Since 1(1;1;m;n) is the ex-ante
probability (i.e., before the bidders draw their values for the ﬁrst auction), each
bidder has equal chances of winning the ﬁrst auction, i.e.,
1(1;1;m;n) = 1=n:
Recallthatifabidderwinstheﬁrstauction, hedoesnotparticipateintheremaining
ones.
Now consider the ex-ante probability 1(2;1;m;n), which is the probability
that a bidder wins the second auction in the series of auctions from the ﬁrst to the
mth one where
1(2;1;m;n) = (1   1=n)(1=(n   1)) = 1=n:
This is because a bidder can win the second auction if he loses the ﬁrst one –
this has probability (1   1=n). The probability of winning the second auction
is 1=(n   1). If he wins the second auction then he does not participate in the
remaining auctions. In the same way, for 1  y  m, we get 1(y;1;m;n) as:
1(y;1;m;n) =
1
n   y + 1
y 1 Y
k=1
(1  
1
n   k + 1
)
=
1
n   y + 1
y 1 Y
k=1
n   k
n   k + 1
=
1
n
: (3)
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1(j;y;m;n) is given by:
1(y;j;m;n) =
1
n   y + 1
y 1 Y
k=j
(1  
1
n   k + 1
)
=
1
n   y + 1
y 1 Y
k=j
n   k
n   k + 1
=
1
n   j + 1
: (4)
Note that 1(y;j;m;n) does not depend on y. Intuitively, before the beginning of
the jth auction, all bidders are symmetric with respect to winning the yth auction,
and there are n   j + 1 bidders left at that point. Hence, each bidder’s probability
of winning the yth auction is 1=(n   j + 1). The winner’s expected proﬁt for the
(y   1)th auction depends on this probability.
Let EP(j;m;n) denote the winner’s expected proﬁt for the jth auction in the
series of m auctions with n bidders for the ﬁrst one. Likewise, let (j;m;n)
denote a bidder’s ex-ante expected proﬁt from winning any one auction in the
series of auctions from the jth (for 1  j  m) to the mth one. This proﬁt is:
(j;m;n) =
m X
y=j
1(y;j;m;n)EP(y;m;n)
=
1
n   j + 1
m X
y=j
EP(y;m;n): (5)
A deﬁnition for EP(y;m;n) will be given in shortly. Note that since there are m
objects, (m + 1;m;n) = 0.
Given that the number of objects is m and the number of bidders for the ﬁrst
auction is n, for auction j, ES(j;m;n) denotes the expected surplus (surplus
is what gets split between the auctioneer and the winning bidder, and it is syn-
onymous with efﬁciency), and ER(j;m;n) the expected revenue. Finally, for n
bidders, E(f
n
j ) and E(s
n
j ) denote the expected ﬁrst and second order statistic [6]
for the distribution F, from which the bidders draw their budget constraints for
auction j.
We now ﬁnd the equilibrium bids for second price rules in Section 4.1.
4.1 Second price rules
We now show that the equilibrium for SPSB rules are as follows. For auction Aj
(1  j  m) the equilibrium bid is:
Bj(x) = minfx;maxf0;aj   (j + 1;m;n)gg (6)
where x is a bidder’s budget constraint, aj is the common value of auction Aj, and
n is the number of bidders for the ﬁrst auction.
Inordertoshowthis, webeginwiththelastauctionandthenreasonbackwards.
Recall that a bidder comes to know its budget constraint for Aj just before auction
j begins (i.e., after the previous j   1 auctions are over).
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Since this is the last auction, the bidding strategies for it are the same as those for
a single object auction [20]. Hence we get the following:
EP(m;m;n) = am   E(s
n m+1
m ) (7)
ER(m;m;n) = E(s
n m+1
m ) (8)
ES(m;m;n) = am (9)
Now consider auction j (1  j < m). Consider bidder 1 and suppose that b

is the highest competing bid. By bidding T = aj   (j + 1;m;n), the bidder
will win if T > b
 and lose if T < b
. Now suppose that he bids z1 < T. If
T > z1  b
, then he still wins and his proﬁt is still T   b
. If b
 > T > z1, he
still loses. But, if T > b
 > z1, then he loses whereas if he had bid T he would
have made a positive proﬁt. Thus, bidding less than T can never increase his proﬁt,
but in some cases it may actually decrease it. A similar argument shows that it is
not proﬁtable to bid more than T.
Note that, for auction j, (j + 1;m;n) is a bidder’s expected ex-ante proﬁt
from winning a future auction and is therefore constant (i.e., it is the same for all
the bidders). Now, this constant may be greater than aj or less than it. Let C
denote the condition (j + 1;m;n) > aj. We ﬁrst analyze the case where C is
true and then the case where C is false.
C True: For this case, aj  (j +1;m;n) is negative, so the equilibrium bid for
a bidder with budget x is:
Bj(x) = minfx;maxf0;aj   (j + 1;m;n)gg
= 0 (10)
Here, the bidder bids zero. The winner pays nothing, so the winner’s proﬁt,
the surplus, and the revenue are:
EP(j;m;n) = aj
ES(j;m;n) = EP(j;m;n)
ER(j;m;n) = 0
C False: For this case, aj   (j + 1;m;n) is positive, so the equilibrium bids
are:
Bj(x) = minfx;aj   (j + 1;m;n)g (11)
Here, the expected surplus, the expected revenue, and the winner’s expected
proﬁt for auction Aj depend on the relationship between x and aj   (j +
1;m;n). Let the budget constraints of the n bidders be xn > xn 1 >  >
x1. Then, there are 3 cases we need to consider. These cases are as follows:
1. Case 1: aj   (j + 1;m;n) > xn,
2. Case 2: xn > aj   (j + 1;m;n) > xn 1 and,
3. Case 3: xn 1 > aj   (j + 1;m;n).
We now analyze each of these cases. In what follows, we let  n denote the
number of bidders for whom x < aj   (j + 1;m;n).
9Consider Case 1. For this case,  n = n. Each bidder bids its own budget
constraint. So the object gets allocated to the bidder with the highest budget.
The winner pays the second highest budget, so the winner’s proﬁt (denoted
WP1), the surplus (denoted WS1), and the revenue (denoted WR1) are:
EP(j;m;n) = aj   E(s
n j+1jf
n j+1
j < aj   (j + 1;m;n))
= WP1 (12)
ER(j;m;n) = E(s
n j+1jf
n j+1
j < aj   (j + 1;m;n))
= WR1 (13)
ES(j;m;n) = aj = WS1 (14)
Consider Case 2. For this case,  n = n 1, i.e., for only one bidder x > aj 
(j +1;m;n) while the remaining n 1 bidders x < aj  (j +1;m;n).
Thus, only one bidder bids aj   (j + 1;m;n), while the remaining n   1
bidders bid their respective budget constraint. Here the object is allocated
to the highest bidder, i.e., the one which bids aj   (j + 1;m;n). The
winner pays the second highest bid. So the winner’s proﬁt (denoted WP2),
the surplus (denoted WS2), and the revenue (denoted WR2) are:
EP(j;m;n) = aj   E(s
n j+1
j j
f
n j+1
j > (j + 1;m;n) > s
n j+1
j )
= WP2
ER(j;m;n) = E(s
n j+1
j j
f
n j+1
j > (j + 1;m;n) > s
n j+1
j )
= = WR2
ES(j;m;n) = aj = WS2
Consider Case 3. For this case,  n  n   2, i.e., two bidder bid aj   (j +
1;m;n) while the remaining n   2 bidders bid their respective budget con-
straint. There are two highest bids (each aj  (j+1;m;n)) and the object
is allocated to one of these with equal probability. The winner pays the sec-
ond highest bid (i.e., aj   (j + 1;m;n)). So the winner’s proﬁt (denoted
WP3), the surplus (denoted WS3), and the revenue (denoted WR3) are:
EP(j;m;n) = 0:5  (j + 1;m;n) = WP3 (15)
ER(j;m;n) = aj   (j + 1;m;n) = WR3
ES(j;m;n) = aj = WS3
By combining these three cases, we get:
EP(j;m;n) = P1  WP1 + P2  WP2 + P3  WP3 (16)
ES(j;m;n) = P1  WR2 + P2  WR2 + P3  WR3 (17)
ER(j;m;n) = P1  WS2 + P2  WS2 + P3  WS3 (18)
where P1, P2, and P3 denote the probability of occurence of Case1, Case2,
and Case3 respectively. These probabilities are:
P1 = [F(aj   (j + 1;m;n))]
n
P2 = [1   F(aj   (j + 1;m;n))]  [F(aj   (j + 1;m;n))]
n 1
P3 = 1   P1   P2
10Given(j+1;m;n), weﬁndEP(j;m;n)andgiven(y;m;n)forj+1 
y  m, we ﬁnd (j;m;n) using Equation 5.
In the same way, it can be shown that the equilibrium bids for English auction rules
are the same a those given in Equation 6.
5 Related Work
To date, most of the work on auctions for multiple heterogeneous objects has fo-
cused on combinatorial auctions [19, 18]. There has been relatively little work on
sequential auctions. Furthermore, most of the work in this area focuses on scenar-
ios in which all objects are identical [21, 22, 12, 15]. For example, Vickrey [21],
studies auctions for multiple identical objects. In this model n identical objects are
bid for at the same time and an object is awarded to each of the n highest bidders.
Milgrom [15] studies auctioning of multiple identical objects in a series of sequen-
tial auctions where only one object is sold at each auction. This private-values
model compares revenues for ﬁrst- and second-price sequential auctions in which
no bidder requires more than one object. While [21, 15] assume that all buyers
have single unit demand, [22, 12] study sequential auctions with multi-unit (i.e.,
two unit) demand. Also, [12] ﬁnds symmetric equilibrium for a two-stage second-
price auction and [22] ﬁnds equilibrium for a two-unit pay-your-bid-auction. Our
work differs from the above in that we deal with multiple heterogeneous objects.
Auctions for multiple heterogeneous objects have been studied in [4]. This
work is similar to ours in the sense that it deals with heterogeneous objects. How-
ever, while our work focuses on sequential auctions, [4] studies simultaneous auc-
tions for multiple objects. Multi-object auctions have also been studied in [5, 1]
– this work determines efﬁcient bidding strategies for heterogeneous private-value
objects. Our work differs in the following way. We focus on common-value auc-
tions for bidders that have budget-constraints.
Sequential auctions for heterogeneous private-value objects have been studied
in [16], and those for common-value objects in [2], but both of them under the
assumption of complete information. In contrast to this, our work focuses on an
incomplete information setting with budget constraints. Elmaghraby [8] studies
sequential auctions for heterogeneous private-value objects using only the second-
price sealed-bid rules. Fatima et al [10, 9, 11] studied sequential auctions for
common and private value objects using English auction rules and SPSB rules for
bidders without budget constraints. Comparing [10, 9, 11] with this paper, we see
that the bidding strategies for the former are special cases of the latter. In a similar
scenario, [7] considers sequential auctions for private value objects. This paper
differs from [7, 8, 10, 9, 11] in that, unlike others, we focus on common-value
auctions for budget-constrained bidders in an incomplete information setting.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper analyzes sequential auctions for budget constrained bidders, for multi-
ple heterogeneous common value objects. In such auctions, the bidders’ problem
is to determine how much to bid at each auction. In this paper we showed that
the strategic bidding behavior depends on the agenda; if we change the agenda,
then the equilibrium bids also change. Then for a given agenda, we determined
11equilibrium bids for each individual auction in a series. We did this for both ﬁrst-
and second-price rules in an incomplete information setting where the bidders are
uncertain about the budget constraints. Comparing [10, 9, 11] with this paper, we
see that the bidding strategies for the former are special cases of the latter.
Thebiddingstrategiesthusdeterminedareusefulfordevelopingagentsthatbid
on our behalf. There are several interesting directions for future work. First, this
paper studied sequential auctions where each bidder has unit demand. In future,
it would be interesting to extend this analysis to the case where a bidder needs
more than one object. Second, we treated the values of the objects as common
knowledge. However, in some real-world scenarios, the players may not know the
value of the objects but may have only probabilistic information about the values
of the objects. It is therefore important to extend the current analysis by treating
the values of objects as probabilistic information.
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